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Abstract.  The new institutional economics regards the firm as a set of incomplete
contracts among input suppliers.  The theory of the firm must therefore explain how
decision-making powers are allocated.  Two leading candidates for such control rights are
capital suppliers and labor suppliers.  Most large enterprises in developed economies
award formal control to investors rather than workers.  I suggest here that this asymmetry
can be traced in part to differences between stock markets and membership markets as
institutional mechanisms for allocating control over firms.  The attractive theoretical
properties of membership markets are examined, along with some factors that may
account for their rarity in practice.  These practical difficulties help explain the rarity of
labor-managed firms themselves, along with various facts about their design, behavior,
and distribution across industries.
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Allocating Control Over Firms:
Stock Markets versus Membership Markets
1. Introduction
Debates surrounding the control of firms have often been complex, protracted,
and loud.  This is particularly true for the position of labor within the firm.  Critics of
capitalism dating back at least to Marx have maintained that the relationship of employer
to employee resembles that between tyrant and citizen.  Reformers and revolutionaries
alike have called for more worker participation in the management of firms.  Here I
examine what economic theory has to say on the subject of worker control, and explore
potential explanations for its relative rarity as a way of organizing large-scale enterprises.
1.1 The New Institutional Economics
A consensus has emerged in the new institutional economics that the firm should
be seen as a set of incomplete contracts among input suppliers (Williamson, 1985;
Grossman and Hart, 1986).  It follows that the right to make decisions not previously
determined by contracts is fundamental to the concept of the firm itself.  These decisions
could involve a variety of matters: product line, investment strategies, wages and
employment, production methods, working conditions, and so on.  Any serious theory of
the firm must say who is authorized to make such decisions and why.  Two leading
candidates for control rights are capital suppliers and labor suppliers.3
A naive economics student might expect the discipline to have developed a cogent
and empirically supported explanation for the conventional assignment of control rights
to investors rather than workers.  Such a student would probably be disappointed. With a
few exceptions (Williamson, 1980; Hansmann, 1996), the new institutional economics
has had little to say on the subject, especially compared with the attention devoted to such
topics as vertical integration.  Remarkably, the economics profession still lacks a
commonly accepted rationale for the prevalence of capitalist firms.
As will be discussed in detail later, some hypotheses about the comparative rarity
of labor-managed firms can be found in the literature, but these typically amount to little
more than casual story-telling supplemented by casual empiricism.  Individual authors
frequently advance their favorite stories in an informal way without recognizing that
alternative stories exist.  Systematic empirical efforts to weed out erroneous ideas have
barely begun.
1.2 The Symmetry Heuristic
If capital and labor were symmetric inputs to the production process in all
physical and institutional dimensions, then capital-managed firms (KMFs) and labor-
managed firms (LMFs) would be symmetric in behavior and performance, and the
incidence of KMFs and LMFs across industries would be fundamentally random.  This is
the level of abstraction implicit in Samuelson’s famous 1957 remark that in a competitive
economy, it makes no difference whether capital hires labor or the reverse.  Such
assertions are tautological, but are nonetheless useful in motivating a search for4
asymmetries between capital and labor that might account for their empirically distinct
organizational roles.
KMFs and LMFs are clearly asymmetric in the real world.  Aside from the
obvious point that LMFs are rare relative to KMFs, the two types of firms differ in their
behavior. For instance, Pencavel and Craig (1994) report that worker-owned plywood
cooperatives have less elastic output supply responses than conventional firms in the
same industry.  Moreover, LMFs seldom adjust membership size in response to short-run
demand or cost shocks, preferring instead to adjust hours or income (Bonin, Jones, and
Putterman, 1993).
Nor are LMFs distributed across industries in a neutral way.  They arise primarily
in professional services (law, accounting), semi-skilled manufacturing (plywood, printing,
leather goods, glassware, furniture), low-skill service tasks (waste removal, taxi service,
reforestation), and construction (details on LMF incidence are provided by Jones, 1984;
Russell, 1985; Ben-Ner, 1988a; Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993; and Hansmann,
1996).  But there are some exceptions to the general rule that LMFs do not engage in
large-scale capital-intensive activities.  One counterexample is the Mondragon system in
Spain (Bradley and Gelb, 1981, 1987; Wiener and Oakeshott, 1987; Whyte and Whyte,
1988).  Other capital-intensive LMFs have arisen via employee buy-outs (Ben-Ner and
Jun, 1996).
The symmetry heuristic suggests that these systematic differences between KMFs
and LMFs should be explained by identifying causally relevant asymmetries in the
features of capital and labor themselves.  Perhaps the most fundamental of these is that
ownership of physical assets can be transferred from one person to another while time and5
skill cannot be.  In short, the ability to supply labor services is inalienable.  It follows that
a worker’s endowment of time, skill, and knowledge cannot exceed natural bounds, while
there is no parallel upper bound on an investor’s physical or financial wealth.  A labor
supplier cannot be in more than one place at one time, but a single person can own many
different physical assets in dispersed locations.  And finally, labor inputs display
considerable heterogeneity, while financial wealth does not.  The effects of these
asymmetries on organizational form will be investigated in the remainder of the paper.
1.3 A Classification System for Organizational Forms
Concretely, a KMF can be visualized as a firm whose board of directors is elected
by investors, while an LMF has a board elected by its workforce.  More generally, a KMF
allocates ultimate formal control by virtue of, and in proportion to, capital supply, while
an LMF allocates these rights by virtue of, and in proportion to, labor supply.  Except
where such distinctions are directly relevant, I will ignore the fact that control is typically
assigned to a subset of investors (equity suppliers rather than debt suppliers), or a subset
of workers (for example, the senior members of the workforce rather than recent arrivals).
Interesting intermediate cases such as codetermination (Pistor, 1999) and collective
bargaining (Rock and Wachter, 1999) will also be neglected in order to keep the
discussion manageable.
The reference to ‘ultimate’ control in the preceding paragraph is intended to
bypass agency issues.  Clearly shareholder control over the directors of corporations is
imperfect, and directors likewise have limited control over managers.  It is nonetheless
significant that the board of directors has the formal authority to fire the CEO, and that6
the shareholders are entitled to choose new directors if they like. I define the ultimate
control group for a firm as the largest coalition of input suppliers whose members each
hold formal decision authority which cannot be revoked by any set of input suppliers
outside the coalition.  Shareholders are the ultimate controllers of the corporation since
their voting rights cannot be taken away from them by non-shareholders, while other
decision-makers can be replaced involuntarily.  Because shareholders supply capital, the
corporation qualifies as a KMF.
This approach conflicts with an alternative tradition summarized by Blair and
Stout (1999), which argues that shareholders do not control large firms in any meaningful
sense.  Rather, shareholder control is highly diluted due to informational and collective
action costs, or (according to Blair and Stout) by deliberate design.  In this view top
management serves as a referee or arbitrator among various stakeholders, possibly
including employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and the local community.  But
although shareholders face practical limits on their ability to exercise control, the fact
remains that they have authority to exercise control, and this sometimes matters.  For
instance, management can be replaced by means of a takeover bid.  The objective here is
to explain why formal voting rights are normally awarded to shareholders rather than
workers.
Organizational forms will be classified on two separate dimensions.  First, control
rights can be assigned to capital or labor suppliers.  This distinction is reasonably clear-
cut if these inputs are supplied by separate agents, as in the first two rows of Table 1 (the
‘unbundled’ case).  It becomes a bit murkier when the same agents supply both inputs
(e.g. when craft workers own their own tools, or a production team owns a factory).  Then7
the control status of a firm depends on its governance structure, as will be discussed
below.
Second, each of the non-human assets needed for production could be owned by
an individual person (the left column of Table 1) or by a group (the right column of Table
1).  For convenience I often refer generically to non-human assets (land, buildings,
computers, client lists, and so on) as ‘machines’.  When ownership is shared, the
corresponding group will need some collective choice procedure to decide how the asset
is utilized.  Such groups may or may not have control over the production activities of the
enterprise itself.
            Asset Ownership
                  Individual Ownership     Shared Ownership
                   of Non-Human Assets of Non-Human Assets
Control by                 machine-owners’           joint-stock       
       Capital                 cooperative using                   company using 
            (unbundled                    hired workers        hired workers
           input supply)                 (KMF)   (KMF)
Control by                workers’ cooperative    workers’ cooperative
Control             Labor                   leasing machines leasing  machines
from
Rights (unbundled                  from individuals  a joint-stock company
           input supply)             (LMF)  (LMF)
 Control by                  workers using        workers using
         Capital or Labor              personally-owned        jointly-owned
          (bundled input                      machines
machines
   supply)                   (KMF/LMF)                              (KMF/LMF)
A Classification System for Organizational Forms8
Table 1
In a world where physical assets are owned by individuals (the left column of
Table 1), several cases can arise.  The firm could be governed by a set of machine owners
who contribute the service flows from their assets to the firm, and hire employees at a
market wage.  The resulting machine-owners’ cooperative is shown in the upper left cell
of Table 1.  But the firm could also be governed by a group of workers who agree to
supply labor services, and lease any required machines from their owners at market
prices.  This is the simple workers’ cooperative shown in the middle left cell of the table.
Finally, capital and labor supply could be bundled (for instance, a law partnership where
each lawyer owns a personal computer).  If votes are equal across workers or proportional
to hours billed, the firm is an LMF.  If votes are proportional to the value of computers
supplied, it is a KMF.
Now suppose that all non-human assets are collectively owned by some group (the
right column in Table 1).  Again several possibilities arise.  The most familiar case occurs
when investors pool their financial resources, buy machines or other assets in the name of
the firm as a whole, hire labor, and collectively run the firm as shown in the upper right
cell of Table 1.  The conventional corporation has this form, as do some partnerships.
This case differs from the top left cell because no individual investor owns an identifiable
chunk of the firm’s physical assets, and therefore cannot unilaterally withhold a specific
machine from the firm.  It is of no importance whether such a firm is established by
having machine owners transfer their assets over to the firm in exchange for financial9
compensation, or by having investors contribute funds to be used for the purchase of
jointly owned machines.
If capital and labor are supplied by separate agents, workers have control, and
non-human assets are leased from a set of investors who use shared ownership, we arrive
at the middle right cell in Table 1.  In this case there are two distinct collective choice
procedures involved: one used by the investors who jointly own a collection of machines
(for instance, to decide which leasing contracts should be accepted), and another by
workers to determine what the firm should produce and how.  The firm is an LMF since it
is the labor suppliers who decide how leased machines will be used in the production
process.
The last alternative in the bottom right cell of Table 1 arises if workers jointly
own the non-human assets used in production.  This organizational form can emerge in
various ways: the founding workers can pool their savings and authorize the firm to buy
machines, they can borrow the necessary funds from a bank and gradually repay the loan
over time, or they can simply donate personally-owned machines to the joint endeavor.
The firm is an LMF if each worker receives one vote or votes are proportional to hours,
but it is a KMF if votes are awarded according to equity investments, debt obligations, or
machine donations.
1.4 Stock Markets and Membership Markets
Any governance structure, whatever its location in Table 1, assigns certain roles to
input suppliers.  The rights and duties associated with such roles must be transferred from
one person to another, in ways specified by the governance structure itself, when turnover10
occurs among the participants.  For instance, in a closely-held corporation an investor
who wants to withdraw from the firm might sell out to a new investor, but only with the
consent of other owners.  In professional partnerships, all partners must usually agree
before one partner can be replaced by someone else.  Issues of the same type include the
conditions (if any) under which a member of the current control group can be expelled by
other members, or under which newcomers can qualify for control rights when the firm
expands.
In a publicly-traded corporation, voting rights are transferred whenever shares of
common stock change hands.  I regard this as a case where control is tied to capital
supply because a share in such a firm conveys two rights simultaneously: the right to vote
for the board of directors, and the right to a proportional claim on the proceeds if the
firm’s non-human assets are liquidated (after other claims against the firm have been
settled).  It is true that someone who buys a share of Microsoft from an existing
shareholder does not directly supply capital to that firm, but each successive shareholder
inherits all rights and duties of the previous shareholder, gains an equivalent claim on the
firm’s non-human assets, and therefore occupies a structurally identical position in the
firm’s governance system.
There cannot be any question that corporations with limited liability, publicly
traded shares, and voting rights attached to common stock have been an enormously
successful institutional innovation during the last 150 years.  Such firms are unchallenged
as a vehicle for organizing large-scale, geographically dispersed, capital-intensive
production activities.  The explanations are familiar: limited liability makes it possible to
raise large amounts of capital from many separate individuals, share markets facilitate11
liquidity as well as portfolio diversification, and voting rights for shareholders imply that
takeover threats impose some discipline on incumbent managers.  These advantages
appear to have outweighed various accompanying drawbacks such as minimal incentives
in widely held firms for shareholders to monitor top managers, due to limited liability and
free rider problems.
The question addressed here is whether similar advantages could be obtained from
a system where voting rights are tied to the supply of labor rather than capital, and where
a market for worker membership in the firm replaces the stock market as the institutional
mechanism by which control rights are transferred from one person to another.  If not, we
need to discover why the textbook symmetry between capital and labor fails in practice.
Section 2 commences by surveying hypotheses that purport to account either for
the general rarity of LMFs or their distribution across industries.  Section 3 provides a fast
and selective review of the comparative systems literature on LMFs, focusing on the
theoretical virtues of LMF membership markets. Section 4 examines the negligible role of
membership markets in the real world, and their evident lack of symmetry with stock
markets.  I argue that two crucial sources of asymmetry involve the inalienability and
heterogeneity of labor, which together imply that membership markets will either be
absent or highly restricted in nature.  Section 5 summarizes a number of conditions likely
to favor LMF viability.
2. Why Are Labor-Managed Firms Rare?12
The hypotheses reviewed here summarize the conventional wisdom of economists
on the question of why formal control over firms is normally assigned to investors.  More
detailed comments can be found elsewhere (Dow and Putterman, 1999, 2000).
2.1 Asset Ownership
Theoretical analyses of LMFs do not always state clearly whether non-human
assets are rented by the LMF, or instead owned by the firm itself.  There are at least two
reasons why it may be impractical for a team of workers to rent assets from outsiders, and
why an LMF would therefore need to use shared asset ownership (the bottom right cell in
Table 1).
Maintenance and depreciation.  If the users of an asset do not own it, they may
have weak incentives to maintain it properly or guard against misuse.  External owners
may also find it costly to detect and punish misuse (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  This
can motivate either close monitoring of workers by outside asset owners (at some cost),
or alternatively asset ownership by workers themselves.  In turn, the latter could involve
either ownership of individual tools by the workers who use them (the bottom left cell in
Table 1), or shared asset ownership by a production team (the bottom right cell in Table
1).  As discussed in section 1, asset ownership by workers implies nothing about whether
the firm is a KMF or LMF, because control rights could be tied to contributions of either
capital or labor.
Asset specificity.  If physical assets are mutually specialized, ownership by
separate individuals in an environment of incomplete information can lead to costly
bargaining over quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985).13
Bargaining might also result in suboptimal investment (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart
and Moore, 1990).  In principle these problems can be eliminated by having one person
own all of the relevant assets.  If this is impossible due to liquidity constraints, or more
diversification is desired, then shared ownership (the right column of Table 1) could be
used to curb hard bargaining.
This reasoning by itself does not yield any predictions about whether a firm will
be organized as a KMF or an LMF.  Even when physical assets are specialized to one
another, they need not be specialized to labor, and if many competing groups are willing
to supply the required assets (e.g. a factory of a certain design),  a worker team could
lease a factory and run the firm, at least if one assumes away depreciation issues.  But if
physical assets and the human capital of the workforce are mutually specialized and
supplied by different agents, bargaining can be expected no matter how control rights are
nominally assigned.
The only way to eliminate such problems is by resorting to bundled input supply
(the last row of Table 1).  If physical assets are not mutually specialized but are
specialized to the user’s human capital, then individual ownership will be likely (the
bottom left cell of Table 1).  But if physical assets are specialized both to one another and
to the human capital of the workforce, shared asset ownership is a more reliable way to
reduce bargaining costs (the bottom right cell of Table 1).  Asset specificity may thus rule
out the pure-rental LMF (Dow, 1993a) but does not preclude an LMF based on shared
asset ownership by workers.
These ideas seem broadly consistent with the incidence of LMFs and KMFs
across industries.  As mentioned in section 1, LMFs usually emerge in small-scale labor-14
intensive sectors.  These firms do not necessarily avoid industries where production
requires generic assets which are easily leased (or bought and sold on second-hand
markets), such as office space, computers, or even airliners (e.g. United Airlines).  But
LMFs are generally absent from industries using highly specialized assets, such as
refineries or auto assembly plants.
2.2 Work Incentives
A prominent early effort to explain why capital suppliers normally manage the
firm is that of Alchian and Demsetz (1972).  They begin from the premise that teamwork
is often productive, but makes it difficult to observe individual effort.  Unless pay is
closely tied to effort, team members will shirk.  The solution is to appoint a monitor who
pays wages that depend on estimated effort.  Shirking by the monitor is prevented by
giving this agent sole claim on the firm’s residual income. The monitor manages the firm
because the information gleaned from monitoring can also be used to coordinate
production.  Finally, the monitor will own any physical assets required by the production
team because these assets would otherwise be overused or poorly maintained, a central
owner has strong incentives to curb such abuse, and the same person should logically
monitor both effort and asset utilization.
In the terminology of Table 1, Alchian and Demsetz are asserting the efficiency of
a degenerate machine-owners’ cooperative where all non-human assets are owned by a
single person.  They reject the idea that a workers’ cooperative could rent assets from
outsiders by emphasizing the monitoring problems surrounding the use and maintenance
of these assets.  The option of a workers’ cooperative that jointly owns physical assets is15
rejected on similar grounds: assets owned by everyone are in practice owned by no one,
so under a system of shared ownership machines will be abused and maintenance will be
neglected.
There are numerous theoretical and empirical objections to this story.  First,
vertical monitoring by a specialist owner may be less effective than mutual monitoring by
a group of co-workers (Putterman, 1984).  Second, it may be possible to motivate team
members to behave efficiently through group bonuses or penalties, without monitoring
individuals at all (Holmstrom 1982).  Third, even without group incentives it is possible
to approximate an efficient equilibrium as long as unlimited penalties can be imposed on
individuals (Legros and Matthews, 1993).  Fourth, shirking on either effort or
maintenance can be deterred in a repeated game if workers place sufficient weight on
future payoffs (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990).  And finally, the relevance of the Alchian
and Demsetz hypothesis for corporations is foggy at best because most employees are
supervised by other employees rather than by a residual claimant.  The shareholders who
do serve as the corporation’s residual claimants have strong incentives to free ride on the
monitoring activities of their fellow shareholders.
Some fragmentary empirical evidence also argues against this hypothesis.  Results
from several longitudinal data sets indicate that profit sharing in large capitalist firms
often increases labor productivity.  Kruse (1993) estimates the increase at 4-5% using
U.S. data.  Similar results have been obtained for the U.K. (Wadhwani and Wall, 1990)
and for Japan (Jones and Kato, 1995).  This research conflicts with the idea that
productivity is greatest when all residual claims are held by a central monitor.  There is
also econometric evidence that LMFs may perform well with respect to labor productivity16
(Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar, 1987; Craig and Pencavel, 1995).  Furthermore, mutual
monitoring and fewer supervisors are often cited as features of worker-owned and profit-
sharing firms (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990; Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993).  Despite
this evidence, however, free-riding on collectively owned assets could still help account
for the rarity of LMFs in industries where production requires large and complex physical
facilities.
2.3 Wealth and Credit Rationing
Probably the most common explanation for the rarity of LMFs is that workers
tend to be poor, and cannot finance the creation of firms which they themselves own.
This idea presupposes that worker-owned firms need start-up financing before they can
generate an internal cash flow.  Because initial financing requirements are unlikely to be
large when all non-human assets can be rented, arguments of this sort require some
auxiliary explanation for the absence of rental markets, perhaps along lines suggested in
section 2.1 above.  The wealth hypothesis also presupposes that workers have limited
access to credit markets.
There are two underlying reasons why workers might be rationed by lenders:
moral hazard and adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  The moral hazard
problem arises when worker-borrowers have incentives to take actions contrary to the
interests of lenders once the loan contract has been signed.  For example, workers might
favor risky projects if they can costlessly declare bankruptcy and leave lenders holding
the bag when unfavorable outcomes occur.  Eswaran and Kotwal (1989) argue in a related
vein that investors manage firms because borrowers would be tempted to substitute inputs17
financed by loans for their own effort contributions.  Short of taking direct control,
lenders may prefer to deal with undemocratic firms since it is easier to influence the
policies of such firms (Gintis, 1989). These problems are likely to be aggravated when
non-human assets are highly specialized, because such assets are not readily used as
collateral (Williamson, 1988). Workers cannot use their human capital as collateral either,
since the inalienability of labor implies that they are free to walk away from failing
projects (Hart and Moore, 1994).
An alternative to debt for workers with limited personal wealth is to sell non-
voting equity shares in order to attract capital without sacrificing control rights.  But
again moral hazard is likely to intrude.  Investors lacking control may worry that workers
will use their decision-making powers in an opportunistic fashion (Putterman, 1993).
Workers therefore need to pay a premium on non-voting equity, disadvantaging LMFs in
relation to capitalist firms.  This notion cuts two ways, however: employees lacking
control rights in capitalist firms may fear opportunistic behavior by investor-owners,
forcing KMFs to pay premium wages compared with the terms on which LMFs can
attract labor.  The result turns on the relative severity of these incentive problems.  One
possible asymmetry is that workers may find it harder to cover the initial costs of building
a reputation for cooperative behavior.
Adverse selection arises when some worker-borrowers have inherently better
skills or projects than others and it is impossible for lenders to distinguish between good
and bad types before issuing a loan.  This can also lead to an equilibrium with credit
rationing.  To be sure, safe borrowers might try to signal their true quality by offering to18
put some of their own money at risk, but such strategies will be infeasible or highly costly
for poor workers.
Adverse selection ideas could be used to devise a life-cycle story about the rarity
of LMFs.  Assume that initially there are strong informational asymmetries about the
profit to be obtained from various entrepreneurial projects, all of which require physical
assets that must be owned by the firm for reasons discussed in section 2.1.  If poor
workers want to pursue such an opportunity, they must persuade a lender that their chosen
project really is profitable, which could prove difficult.  A wealthy investor can pursue a
similar project by creating a KMF and hiring a group of employees, who need not have
any particular opinion about the merits of the project.  If the KMF owner offered to
finance a transfer of the firm’s assets to its workforce through a debt contract, however,
the workers would now have to be convinced of the profitability of the owner’s project,
which might again prove difficult.  The initial KMF structure therefore persists as the
firm prospers and expands.
Over time these informational asymmetries will recede as the underlying
production technology and market environment become clearer.  Thus at some point it
should become possible for the founding investors to shift asset ownership and control
rights to workers, perhaps through a payroll deduction plan that avoids any need for
external financing.  For example, an employee buy-out might substitute for taking a
closely-held firm public when the founders wish to retire or diversify.  But now some new
problems arise.  First, even if the value of the firm’s physical assets is clear, the
employees face a multilateral bargaining problem among themselves because they must
agree on a cost-sharing scheme.  This could be troublesome since each worker’s19
willingness to pay for creation of an LMF is private information (for instance, it depends
on the worker’s reservation wage, preferences about firm policies, and beliefs about the
preferences of other workers).  Second, if the firm is now large there will be a significant
collective action problem in organizing workers to negotiate with the current asset
owners.  These obstacles may thwart an employee buy-out, except in extreme situations
where firm survival is at stake (Ben-Ner and Jun, 1996).  The KMF governance structure
can thus remain in place indefinitely.
Most LMFs are in fact financed by the savings of worker-members and by
retained earnings (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993).  This is compatible with the idea
that LMFs lack access to credit markets, though there are no data comparing the cost of
external capital for KMFs and LMFs.  The wealth hypothesis is also consistent with the
fact that LMFs tend to avoid capital-intensive industries or those having significant scale
economies.  The Mondragon case is the exception that proves the rule, since almost all
observers stress the unique role of Mondragon’s cooperatively-owned bank (see
references in section 1.2).
On the other hand, workers sometimes pay large up-front fees to join LMFs.  In
the plywood cooperatives new members have been known to pay more than $50,000 for
the shares of retirees (Craig and Pencavel, 1992).  Other LMFs also require significant
up-front payments, including the Italian producer cooperatives (Estrin, Jones, and
Svejnar, 1987). The workers involved are unlikely to be representative of the labor force,
but such examples raise suspicions that limited worker wealth may not be the binding
constraint on the further spread of LMFs.  It is unclear under the wealth hypothesis why
union pension funds are seldom used to finance employee buy-outs (this may reflect20
diversification goals, as discussed in section 2.4 below).  Finally, U.S. firms routinely
convey common shares to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in exchange for
wage deductions, although the stock held by ESOPs usually falls short of a majority and
shares held in the name of employees are generally voted by a trustee appointed by
management (Hansmann, 1990a, 1990b; Blair, Kruse, and Blasi, 2000).  The wealth
hypothesis offers no explanation for the failure of employees to gain control rights in
proportion to their ESOP investments.
2.4 Risk Aversion and Insurance
Another popular hypothesis about the rarity of LMFs is that workers are more risk
averse than investors, either because they are less able to diversify or they are less
wealthy.  This idea can be traced to Knight’s (1964) view that the venturesome
(enterpreneurs) will insure the timid (workers) by paying fixed wages.  Entrepreneurs
manage the production process because only residual claimants have the proper
incentives for this task.  Aspects of this view have been developed by Meade (1972),
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), and Dreze (1989). The risk hypothesis does not imply that
the person who insures workers and runs the firm must also supply capital, and thus
applies even if physical assets are easily rented.
From the standpoint of modern principal-agent theory, this explanation for the
rarity of worker control is incomplete.  It is widely recognized that workers always retain
ultimate control over their own effort choices because it is not feasible to specify effort in
a legally binding contract.  As a result, efficient contracts do not usually give workers full
insurance (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 1994).  Employee compensation is linked to21
results, either directly or indirectly, despite the fact that this forces workers to bear some
risk.  Otherwise, effort will be perfunctory.  But then workers are partial residual
claimants and have a stake in how the firm is managed.  No available theory describes
how control rights are divided between workers and insurers in such cases, although
workers who are more risk averse presumably receive greater insurance and make fewer
decisions.
Now suppose joint asset ownership is adopted for one of the reasons in section 2.1
so workers in an LMF would have to be both capital suppliers and labor suppliers (though
by definition, control is proportional to labor supply).  If workers are more risk averse
than investors, the insurance problem re-emerges as a problem of diversification.  Other
things equal, worker-owners would like to sell some or all of the firm’s equity shares to
outsiders and use the proceeds to diversify their own portfolios.  Worker control requires
that these equity shares be non-voting.  As in section 2.3, moral hazard may force workers
to pay a premium to investors for such financing if it is available at all (Putterman, 1993).
The need for workers to diversify their portfolios is still more pressing when their human
capital is highly specialized.  But if LMFs have offsetting productivity advantages (such
as increased effort, more information sharing, or less internal conflict) then they may
provide expected returns that are high enough to compensate workers for bearing these
additional risks.
The risk aversion framework accounts for the fact that LMFs do not often appear
in capital-intensive sectors of the economy, because workers would have to make large
equity investments that would oblige them to forego diversification.  However, there are a
number of intriguing anomalies.  First, the industries where LMFs do thrive are not22
necessarily low risk.  For instance, worker-owned plywood firms face large variations in
input and output prices (Craig and Pencavel, 1992; Pencavel and Craig, 1994).  Second,
worker control can diminish the risks borne by labor suppliers, because LMF members
are not vulnerable to decisions such as layoffs that benefit shareholders at the expense of
employees (Miceli and Minkler, 1995).  As noted earlier LMFs usually respond to
negative shocks by maintaining employment and reducing incomes, so it is necessary to
compare this policy with the more conventional KMF pattern of maintaining wages while
absorbing shocks through layoffs.
If risk aversion were the dominant factor behind the prevalence of capitalist firms,
it should be similarly important for the nature of employment contracts within capitalist
firms. One might think for example that in industries where layoffs are costly and occur
with high probability, firms would have to pay employees a wage that includes a large
risk premium.  But Murphy and Topel (1987: 130) have found that a one standard
deviation increase in the variance of annual weeks worked (4.75 weeks) requires
compensation in average annual earnings of only about $45.  This modest effect suggests
that risk aversion is unlikely to be a central determinant of organizational form.
Furthermore, profit sharing is an increasingly common element in the pay of front-line
workers (Kruse, 1993), as are stock options and ESOPs.  Not only does there seem to be
no major difficulty in compensating employees for the resulting income risks, there
appears to be little empirical connection between the degree of variation in profit or
employment and firms’ use of profit sharing or ESOPs (Ben-Ner, Burns, Dow, and
Putterman, 2000).23
2.5 Collective Choice
A small but expanding literature holds that LMFs have difficulty reaching
collective decisions because worker objectives tend to be more heterogeneous than those
of investors. The idea is that capital suppliers unanimously support the maximization of
profit or present value, while workers have widely diverse attitudes toward effort,
scheduling, job security, safety, social atmosphere, and other features of the workplace.
Thus it is more difficult or costly for LMFs to make managerial decisions than it is for
KMFs (Hansmann, 1996).
Hansmann points out that majority voting among workers who have
heterogeneous preferences is likely to run up against the problem of cycling, where for
every possible firm policy there is an alternative proposal that is preferred by some
majority coalition.  There are solutions to the cycling problem, but each disadvantages the
LMF in relation to KMFs.  For instance, the firm could screen incoming firm members to
ensure uniform preferences; eschew an extensive division of labor, large skill
differentials, or wage inequalities to avoid conflict; or remain at a suboptimal scale to
limit the size of the decision-making group.  It is also possible to restrict enterprise
democracy by limiting opportunities for workers to place proposals on the agenda;
avoiding direct participation in favor of representative democracy; disenfranchising
groups such as clerical workers whose interests diverge from those of the dominant
coalition; or delegating decisions to a manager.  Hansmann (1996) and Benham and
Keefer (1991) supply evidence that some combination of these measures is employed by
virtually all LMFs.  Relatedly, Gordon (1999) provides a vivid portrait of the Byzantine
governance structure established at United Airlines in the wake of an employee buy-out.24
A specific variation on the collective choice theme is the idea that firms adopting
the principle of ‘one worker, one vote’ will suffer from excessive egalitarianism with
respect to income distribution (Kremer, 1997).  If high-ability workers expect such
policies, they will take jobs at KMFs where they are paid their marginal products, rather
than investing in the LMF and making themselves vulnerable to redistributive wage
proposals.  LMFs may try to commit themselves in advance not to adopt an inefficient
degree of wage compression, but it could be hard to devise a constitution that restrains
such behavior effectively.
There have also been some arguments that the heterogeneity of worker
preferences makes LMFs an unstable mode of organization.  Ognedal (1993) argues that
mixed patterns of share ownership where workers and investors both have voting rights
are unstable when trading in shares is allowed.  Skillman and Dow (1999) similarly
conclude that LMFs with individually tradeable shares are likely to prove unstable since
investors can typically take over such firms by proposing bids that 51% of the worker-
owners are willing to accept.  I will return to this problem of organizational instability in
sections 4 and 5 below.
3. Labor-Managed Firms and Membership Markets
The hypotheses in section 2 have been developed largely by authors working
within the new institutional economics.  There is also a sizable body of research on LMFs
in the field of comparative economics.  This section gives a brief and highly selective
overview of the comparative systems tradition as a prelude to comments on LMF
membership markets. For additional information interested readers should consult the25
two-volume anthology by Prychitko and Vanek (1996), as well as the survey by Bonin
and Putterman (1987).
3.1 The Perverse LMF
The most striking feature of theoretical work on LMFs in the comparative systems
area is the degree to which the literature is dominated by a single core assumption: LMFs
maximize net income per worker-member.  In volume I of the Prychitko-Vanek
collection, for example, fifteen out of twenty-seven articles either develop the
implications of this per capita maximand or criticize it in some way.  I call such LMFs
Ward-Domar-Vanek (WDV) firms, after the three earliest developers of the model
starting with Ward (1958).
The WDV model predicts a number of differences between the behavior of LMFs
and conventional profit-maximizing firms.  First, LMFs will have less elastic output
supply responses when output prices increase, because they restrict membership when
firm profit is positive in order to limit the size of the group entitled to share in such
profits.  In extreme cases, the output supply curve can bend backward.  Other
comparative static perversities include a tendency for output to expand when fixed costs
increase.  Second, the absence of a labor market implies an inefficient short run allocation
of labor across firms because there is no mechanism through which labor can move from
firms where its marginal product is low to firms where it is high, except in the long run
through entry and exit of firms.  Third, profitable LMFs ‘degenerate’ into KMFs by hiring
non-member wage laborers as the firm expands, or as departing members are replaced
(Ben-Ner, 1984, 1988b; Miyazaki, 1984).26
Such LMFs tend to underinvest out of retained earnings because members who
plan to leave the firm cannot capitalize subsequent investment returns (Pejovich, 1969;
Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970; Furubotn, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1979).  Hence it is
unattractive to sacrifice wages for the sake of internal capital accumulation (the ‘horizon
problem’).  A closely related notion is that future members will share in the investment
returns resulting from sacrifices made by current insiders, so the latter will hesitate to
make investments that require admitting new members (the ‘common property problem’).
Neither problem is significant in a corporation because the stock market allows departing
owners to capture the present value of future investment returns by selling their shares to
new owners.
These negative conclusions about the LMF generated much debate, with skeptics
citing the alleged inefficiencies of this organizational form and proponents devising
various theoretical epicycles in an attempt to make LMFs appear less dysfunctional. For
instance, proponents developed models with additional margins of choice (hours, effort)
or complex ways of exposing LMFs to the true opportunity cost of labor (e.g. having laid-
off members receive unemployment benefits whose size depends on wages elsewhere).
Indeed, Dreze (1989) designed a comprehensive system of corrective taxes for a labor-
managed economy.
This debate was conducted with little or no reference to empirical evidence on
LMF behavior, and little attention to the property rights and governance structures found
in actual LMFs.  In particular, the WDV model neglected to specify the terms on which
workers join or leave LMFs.  To rationalize the theoretical model, one must assume (a)
there are no side payments between insiders and new applicants, even if all parties could27
be made better off through such transfers; and (b) the insiders will expel a member in
good standing without compensation if this raises the incomes of the remaining members.
Neither assumption is a reasonable description of the property rights in real LMFs.  The
premise that newcomers do not pay up-front fees to incumbent members is false for the
plywood cooperatives, and for many European cooperatives as well.  LMFs also provide
considerably greater job security than similar capitalist firms, rarely expel members
except for poor performance, and often compensate departing members (Bonin, Jones,
and Putterman, 1993).
3.2 The Non-Perverse LMF
By the mid-1980s it became clear that the theoretical swamp surrounding the
WDV firm could be drained by having the firm alter its membership if and only if there
are mutual gains to the affected parties.  Mutual gains can be obtained through expansion
if the value of labor’s marginal product exceeds the external wage because the resulting
surplus can be split between the current insiders and a newcomer.  Likewise, mutual gains
can be obtained from contraction if the opposite is true, since the surplus generated by
having one member leave can be split between the departing member and the workers
who remain behind.  The natural way to implement this procedure is to create a market
for LMF membership, which under competitive conditions is a perfect substitute for the
usual labor market (Sertel, 1982; Dow, 1986, 1993b, 1996; Fehr, 1993).  This
institutional design leads LMFs to maximize profit rather than net income per worker by
forcing insiders to value labor at its opportunity cost.  The result is comparative static28
behavior identical to that of a conventional firm, and an efficient allocation of labor
across firms in both the short and long runs.
LMF membership markets avoid the degeneration problem where retiring
members are replaced with wage laborers by enabling new applicants to buy their way
into the firm at a price that compensates insiders for the income loss they suffer by
sharing profits among a larger membership group.  The horizon and common property
problems vanish because the membership market enables a departing worker to capture
the present value of investment returns by selling his or her membership rights, either to a
new worker or to the firm itself.  This procedure substitutes for the stock market as a way
of pricing future income streams.
With hindsight, none of this is surprising.  In a world of complete and competitive
markets, it does not make any difference which group of input suppliers runs the firm.  As
was emphasized in the introduction, when capital and labor are symmetric economic
theory has no leverage in explaining the allocation of control rights between them.  But
despite the attractive theoretical features of LMF membership markets, they are rarely
observed.  This is a key puzzle for the theory of the firm because imperfections in
membership markets help to clarify LMF comparative static behavior, the cross-industry
incidence of LMFs, and the design features that successful LMFs typically possess.
4. Why Are Membership Markets Rare?
The only prominent example of an LMF membership market involves the
plywood cooperatives in the U.S. northwest, where new applicants can purchase
membership rights from departing workers. These LMFs have been studied in29
considerable detail by Craig and Pencavel (1992) and Pencavel and Craig (1994).  Other
worker-owned firms also require new members to pay significant up-front fees (Estrin,
Jones, and Svejnar, 1987), which are often construed as contributions to the working
capital of the firm.  However, it appears that such entry fees are not usually set at market
clearing levels (on queueing by applicants at Mondragon, see Bonin, Jones, and
Putterman, 1993: 1295).  Nor are membership rights generally assigned a market value
when a worker leaves the firm.  Workers instead receive a refund on their individual
capital accounts, which are valued using a rigid interest rate that has at most a tenuous
link to historical rates of return within the firm, and no connection at all to the present
value of future profits.
This avoidance of market-determined prices at entry and exit is interesting in view
of the theoretical virtues of membership markets outlined in section 3.2.  It is also curious
that LMFs would shy away from membership markets while KMFs routinely permit
public trading of their shares on stock markets.  I turn now to some potential
explanations.
4.1 Wealth Constraints and Risk Aversion
Many of the hypotheses from section 2 about the rarity of LMFs in general can be
recycled as stories about imperfections in membership markets.  For instance one can
argue that membership markets fail because workers have limited wealth, and hence
cannot afford to buy their way into a firm.  However, the price of membership reflects the
present value of the difference between per capita LMF income and the external wage.
This gap is driven by the value of jointly-owned assets per worker, as well as rents in the30
product market (if any), and would be small for a labor-intensive firm in a competitive
industry. Moreover, some workers do have large personal savings and it is unclear why
LMFs where jobs are in excess demand would not ration these jobs using a price
mechanism that is profitable to the insiders.  In any case LMFs often do impose up-front
fees on new members.  What they typically do not do is permit workers to trade their
membership rights on an open market.
It might seem that risk aversion would be the main obstacle to membership
markets, since workers would need to put a substantial chunk of their financial portfolio
into a single asset whose returns are highly correlated with the returns on their human
capital.  There is some evidence that membership shares in the plywood cooperatives
have been consistently underpriced (Craig and Pencavel, 1992), in the sense that the
present value of membership turned out to be substantially larger ex post than the price
paid ex ante. Craig and Pencavel suggest that this apparent underpricing may reflect
implicit compensation for risk.
If workers are concerned about risk this should be reflected in membership prices,
just as idiosyncratic risks affect the prices of other assets.  The existence of a risk
premium on a membership claim does not imply a market failure, any more than a risk
premium on common shares implies a market failure among ordinary corporations.  But
at any rate, the relevant comparison is between LMFs with membership markets and
LMFs without them.  Most of the force of the risk aversion argument is already spent
once LMFs exist, because jointly-owned assets have been financed and workers have
already chosen to bear the risks of residual claimant status.  Market-determined31
membership prices merely repackage these risks so it is unlikely that risk aversion can
explain the rarity of membership markets per se.
4.2 The Inalienability of Labor
Several key features of an LMF membership market follow from the inalienability
of labor.  If control rights are tied to labor supply, it is impossible to transfer LMF control
from person A to person B without replacing A’s labor services with B’s labor services.
On the other hand, in a corporation the voting rights attached to a share of common stock
can be passed from A to B without altering the physical assets owned by shareholders as a
group.  Instead A’s role as a partial owner of these jointly-held assets is transferred to B.
The same is true for the machine-owners’ cooperative described in Table 1: control rights
could be passed from person A to person B by having B buy A’s machine and acquire A’s
organizational role, without any change in the firm's physical inputs.
The alienability of non-human assets thus makes it possible to separate the market
for KMF control from the use of physical inputs.  This separation is absent for the LMF
so frictions in the labor market imply frictions in the market for LMF control.  While a
KMF must confront similar frictions in hiring labor, these do not translate into control
problems.
A catalogue of labor market frictions is easily compiled.  For instance, it is
difficult to be in two places at once and travel costs are often significant, so most workers
hold only one job at a time.  Due to costs associated with search, turnover, and relocation,
workers also tend to change jobs infrequently.  Thus the membership market for a
particular LMF will normally become active only when a specific job opens up.  The32
heterogeneity of labor services implies that few applicants may be good candidates for the
job in question.  The membership market may therefore involve bilateral bargaining
between a new applicant and the current insiders, or between an applicant and a departing
member.  Bargaining of this sort seems likely to involve private information (applicants
may know little about the firm’s prospects, while insiders know little about the abilities or
preferences of applicants).
In contrast, investors can hold partial claims on the assets of many different firms
simultaneously, together with associated voting rights.  These claims can be traded almost
instantaneously.  Thus the market for a large firm’s shares will be extensive.
Informational asymmetries concerning firm value are usually mitigated by the presence of
some informed traders, so that significant information is built into a firm’s share price.  It
is also possible for a small group to take control of a firm simply by buying out a majority
of shareholders.  On the other hand, a takeover in an LMF poses a major collective action
problem: outsiders must assemble a team capable of supplying 51% of the firm’s labor
services, and then buy out the membership rights of 51% of the incumbent workforce.
4.3 Adverse Selection
Adverse selection problems appear to be especially serious in a membership
market.  In their roles as decision-makers, residual claimants, and joint asset owners,
current LMF insiders have a keen interest in the characteristics of any new member.  A
severe externality problem arises if departing members are allowed to sell their
membership positions directly to prospective replacements, because the worker leaving
the firm has no reason to care about the quality of the replacement worker, and will33
instead sell out to the highest bidder regardless of the cost to those insiders who remain
behind.  To appreciate the nature of the problem an academic economist need only
imagine a system where departmental colleagues can transfer their professorships to
whoever will pay them the most money.  A workable membership market necessarily
requires that departing members sell their positions back to the LMF so that insiders can
internalize quality effects when seeking suitable replacements.
Analogous restrictions for a KMF would involve prohibiting direct sales of shares
on equity markets.  Shareholders who wanted to liquidate their holdings would be
required to sell their shares back to the firm, which might have to find new investors to
finance the required payout.  Such restrictions are common for closely-held firms where
there are only a few decision-makers (Rock and Wachter, 1999), but entail serious losses
of liquidity and diversification.  These limitations are overcome in publicly traded firms
because normally there is no externality: person C has no interest in share transactions
between A and B.  The only exception occurs when firm control is at stake, as in a
takeover bid, since the policies of the new owners will matter to all shareholders who do
not plan to sell.
The adverse selection problem for a membership market runs deeper still.  If labor
is characterized by unobservable quality variations, KMFs and LMFs must both cope
with this problem and there is no reason why such informational asymmetries in isolation
would lead to any organizational asymmetry.  Similarly if there is unobservable variation
in the quality of the physical assets owned by the firm, investors purchasing shares in a
KMF and workers purchasing membership in an LMF both need to consider the
implications for firm value.  However, the KMF locates these problems in separate34
markets, each with one-sided adverse selection: the labor market and the equity market.
The LMF instead combines them by creating a membership market with two-sided
adverse selection, where insiders do not know the quality of new applicants and outsiders
do not know the value of joining the firm.  This can lead to an equilibrium where
membership transactions are rare, most LMFs have low productivity, or LMFs are simply
displaced by KMFs (Dow, 1998).
4.4 Organizational Instability
The collective choice hypothesis from section 2.5 suggested that investors usually
support wealth-maximizing policies in a firm, while workers have heterogeneous
attitudes toward working conditions, wage equality, social atmosphere, and similar
matters.  Again, this difference in objectives can be traced back to the inalienability of
labor: workers have to be physically present in order to engage in production.  As noted in
section 2.5, Skillman and Dow (1999) show that such heterogeneity in worker preferences
makes an LMF with individually tradeable control rights vulnerable to takeover by
investors, because there are almost always gains from trade between a coalition of
investors and a majority of current LMF members.  This instability problem is severe if
investors can commit in advance to adopt specific policies, but also arises when such
commitments are impossible if a majority of LMF insiders would like to shift the firm’s
policies in a profit-maximizing direction.
Possible responses to this dilemma range from a constitutional provision requiring
a supermajority to approve an investor takeover, to a ban on direct transfers of control
rights among individuals.  The latter solution shuts down the membership market.  As35
will be argued in section 5, a price must be paid for this.  But if the LMF has some
productivity advantages (perhaps stronger effort incentives, better information sharing, or
less internal conflict than a KMF), and the prospect of an investor takeover looms large,
the firm might forego a membership market while nonetheless surviving in competition
with KMF rivals.
5. Conditions Favoring the Labor-Managed Firm
Despite the nice theoretical properties described in section 3, an LMF membership
market is fraught with difficulties that either do not arise at all, or arise only in highly
muted form, for KMF stock markets. Section 4 argued that most of these involve the
inalienability of labor, which implies that control cannot be transferred among workers
without altering the bundle of labor services used in production.  But ownership of non-
human inputs can be alienated so control rights in a KMF can be traded while retaining
the same input bundle.  This is the fundamental asymmetry between membership markets
and stock markets.
Imperfect LMF membership markets should in theory lead to attenuated versions
of the Ward-Domar-Vanek pathologies from section 3.1.  These pathologies do have
empirical counterparts in worker-owned plywood companies, although their extent is
exaggerated by the WDV assumption of per capita income maximization.  As mentioned
earlier, Pencavel and Craig (1994) find that output supply is less elastic (but not backward
bending) for the plywood cooperatives as compared with conventional firms operating in
the same industry.  They also find almost no short run response of workforce size to
demand or cost shocks, contradicting theoretical predictions that membership markets36
will induce profit-maximizing comparative static responses for labor as well as all other
inputs and outputs.  In addition to such comparative static rigidities, these cooperatives
seem to have undervalued membership shares (perhaps involving a risk premium as
discussed in section 4.1, but possibly a sign of adverse selection in the labor market),
routinely hire non-member labor, and sometimes disappear through takeover by investor-
owned firms.
Most other labor-managed firms have opted to forego membership markets
entirely and live with the consequences.  Apart from comparative static rigidities these are
likely to include reluctance to expand even under favorable market conditions, and
underinvestment in collectively-owned assets. The phenomenon of LMF degeneration
through the hiring of wage laborers is widespread (Ben-Ner, 1988b), as is the tendency
for founding members to sell out to capitalist firms at retirement (Hansmann, 1990a,
1990b).  These problems do not imply that it is impossible for LMFs to succeed in
competition with conventional firms, because LMFs can have offsetting advantages as
noted at the end of section 4.  But LMFs do exhibit a characteristic pattern of advantages
and disadvantages, enabling them to thrive in some economic niches while undermining
their viability elsewhere.
A quick checklist of the conditions under which LMFs may be expected to
perform well in competition with capitalist firms can now be provided.  The connections
with earlier theoretical arguments should be apparent and will not be developed in further
detail.
(a) Production technology and the market environment are common knowledge.37
(b) Production depends strongly upon teamwork and information sharing.
(c) Production does not require an extensive division of labor.
(d) Production places workers in close geographic proximity.
(e) Mutual monitoring is cheap and accurate compared to monitoring by supervisors.
(f) Non-human assets are easily maintained and not highly vulnerable to abuse.
(g) Non-human assets are not highly specialized.
(h) High rates of investment in shared non-human assets are not required.
(i) The cost penalty for operating below minimum efficient scale is minor.
(j) Workers have substantial wealth compared to the per capita financing needs of
their firms, or external financing is readily available.
(k) Workers are not strongly risk averse, either due to their personal preferences or
the availability of personal wealth that can be diversified through financial
markets.
(l) The industry is characterized by relatively stable input and output prices.
(m) Rigidity in the face of short run cost or demand shocks is not strongly penalized.
(n) Workers prefer job security even at the expense of fluctuations in income or
hours.
(o) Egalitarian treatment of members does not conflict strongly with a need for
internal incentives, or a need to recruit members on outside markets at unequal
wages.
(p) Workers are relatively homogeneous with respect to age, sex, and ethnic, cultural,
or religious background.38
(q) Adverse selection problems are minor because worker skills and the quality of
non-human physical assets are easily ascertained in advance.
(r) Exogenous worker turnover is infrequent.
This list could be extended but suffices as a broad portrait of the characteristics
that successful LMFs tend to have.  Most of the LMFs described in section 1.3 in fact
display such characteristics.  Of course, no LMF has all of the features mentioned, but
most have several.  These features can be viewed as predictions about the long run
incidence of LMFs across industries and may not apply to transitional cases, including
those where employees have bought out a failing conventional firm.  It should also be
kept in mind that the relative importance of the points cited here is under active debate.
Finally, the above list is intended in a purely descriptive or explanatory spirit, and
normative inferences should be resisted.  It could be that the rarity of LMFs derives
largely from remediable market failures.  But before one can come to any confident
verdict on that score, it is necessary to have a well-corroborated theory accounting for the
behavior of real LMFs, their typical design features, and their distribution across
industries.
The causal mechanisms responsible for the rarity of LMFs are complex.  Different
obstacles may be paramount depending on production technology, the market
environment, the current stage in the firm’s life-cycle, and the economic development of
the surrounding society.  There are likely to be complicated interaction effects among
various causal factors.  In short, it is not a trivial exercise to explain why investors
normally control firms.39
A useful research program on control rights would focus on explanation rather
than polemics; rely on empirical evidence to discriminate among hypotheses; exploit the
toolkit of modern microeconomic theory; remain sensitive to nuances of organizational
design; and attempt to trace asymmetries in the allocation of control rights between
capital and labor to physical or institutional differences in the characteristics of these
inputs.  Much research on LMFs has departed from these heuristic principles and has
therefore made little contact with mainstream industrial organization.  But perhaps in
years to come economists will be better able to tell their students why the economy they
inhabit is predominantly a capitalist one.40
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